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INTRODUCTION

President Bush has announced his Administration's Clear Skies
Initiative to regulate power plant emissions, including nitrogen oxides ("NOx") and sulfur dioxide ("SO 2"). 1 This initiative was introduced in the 107 th Congress in a bill sponsored by Senator Bob
Smith (R-NH). 2 A competing bill proposed by Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) narrowly passed the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee in June 2002. 3 Both the Clear Skies Initiative
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** Dallas Burtraw is Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future. The authors
thank Elisabeth Irwin and David Lankton for their excellent research assistance
and Bob Hahn, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Marc Ribaudo for helpful discussions.
Dallas Burtraw can be reached at Burtraw@rff.org. The authors alone are responsible for the views in this article.
1. See White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002)
(announcing President George W. Bush's plan to reduce nitrogen oxides ("NO,")
and
sulfur
dioxide
("SO2")
by
70%),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiesfactsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
2. S. 2815, 10 7th Cong. (2002). Companion legislation was introduced in the
House of Representatives as H.R. 5266, 107th Cong. (2002) by Rep. Joe Barton
(R-TX).
3. See Press Release, Senate Environment and Public Works, Majority Office, Jeffords Moves Clean Power Act Out of Committee (June 27, 2002) (announcing the passage of the Clean Power Act through the Senate Environment and
Public
Works
Committee),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/maj_pr 062702b.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Jefford's Proposal differs from the Clear Skies Initiative in that it calls for mandatory
*
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and the Jeffords' Proposal take a "cap and trade" approach 4 to
achieve dramatic emission reductions by limiting emissions on a
pollutant-by-pollutant basis. 5 These approaches, however, both miss
an opportunity to simultaneously reduce compliance costs and environmental damages because they do not allow trading between pollutant limitations. In particular, the legislative proposals prohibit
tradeoffs between two pollutants that cause similar environmental
problems, NOx and SO 2.6
We recommend enabling trading between pollutants. Market
forces would not only act to affect the supply of NO,,and SO 2 permits but also the relative stringency of controls for each pollutant.
Trading between pollutants could both reduce compliance costs and
increase expected environmental benefits.7 Cost savings from integrating NOx and SO 2 markets could exceed $1.1 billion per year
without a reduction in expected environmental benefits.8
Trading between NO, and SO 2 emissions makes sense for three
reasons. First, these pollutants have similar environmental effects.
For example, the biggest reason, by far, for stringent new emissions
limits is that both NO, and SO 2 raise concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM), 9 which in turn boosts mortality risk ° and restricts
carbon emission cuts. See Senator James Jeffords, Statement on Clear Skies Proposal for the Senate Comm. On Env't and Pub. Works (July 29, 2002), at
http://jeffords.senate.gov/-jeffords/ress/02/06/07292002clear_skies.html
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2002).
4. The cap and trade program establishes federally enforceable emissions
limits for each pollutant and allows sources to transfer these among themselves to
achieve the required reductions at the lowest cost. See EPA, Fact Sheet on Clear
Skies Initiative (2002) (describing Clear Skies Initiative mandatory emissions
reduction plan based on a cap and trade program), available at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskes/clearskiesfactsheet 3_26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002); see also Clean Power Act of 2001, S.556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001)
(providing the objectives,
guidelines, and authority for EPA activity in this area).
th
5. S.2815, 107' Cong. § 403 (2002); Press Release, Senate Environment
and Public Works, Majority Office, Jeffords Moves Clean Power Act Out of
Committee
(June
27,
2002),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/majpr 062702b.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
6. See, eg., S.2815, 107- Cong. § 403 (2002) (omitting trading between NO,
and SO 2 ).
7. See infra Environmental Damages section.
8. See id.
9. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT-RTP OFFICE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH
AND DEV., EPA, EPA/600/P-99/002AC, THIRD EXTERNAL REvIEw DRAFT OF AIR

QUALITY CRITERIA FOR PARTICULATE MATTER VoI.1, page E-5 (APRIL, 2002),

available

at
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visibility." Both pollutants also contribute to high levels of acidity
in lakes and forests.' 2 And while it is true that nitrogen, but not sulfur, contributes to eutrophication of water bodies,' 3 controlling this
eutrophication through better farm practices is likely to be much
cheaper than regulations on power plants. 14 Furthermore, while
NO,, but not SO 2, raises ozone concentrations, 15 the public health
small compared with the public
implications of ozone are quite
16
health effects of elevated PM.
Second, increasing one pollutant in exchange for reductions in the
other would affect only a fraction of total anthropogenic emissions
because utilities are only one of many sources of NOx and S02.17 To
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/partmatt/VOLIAQCD-PM3rdReviewDraft.p
df (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
10. Id. at E-23.
11. Id. atE-32.
12. Id. at E-28.
13. Eutrophication is an increase in the rate of supply of organic matter to a
water body, and usually refers to an increase in the rate of algal production. See
Chris Clement, S. B. Bricker & D.E. Pirhalla, Eutrophic Conditions in Estuarine
Waters,
STATE

NATIONAL

OCEANIC

AND

ATMOSPHERIC

ADMINISTRATION.

at
http://state-of(2001),
coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/html/eut_1 8/intro.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); Nitrogen but not sulfur is a plant nutrient. See FLORIDA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION
OF

THE

COAST

REPORT

SERVICE, INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA, A BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO WATER MANAGEMENT - NUTRIENTS n.2

(2002), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODYFA079#FOOTNOTE_2 (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002). N.B.: this reference does not explicitly state that sulfur is
not a nutrient.
14. A variety of studies substantiate this point, although they all poorly address
the costs of implementing and enforcing control measures. See, e.g., COASTAL
OCEAN PROGRAM, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DECISION ANALYSIS SERIES NO. 20, EVALUATION OF THE
ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF METHODS FOR REDUCING NUTRIENT LOADS

TO THE GULF OF MEXICO, Tables B.1, B.3 (1999), available at
http://www.nos.noaa.gov/pdflibrary/hpox t6final.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
15. See EPA National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Final Rule,
62 Fed. Reg. 38,858 (July 18, 1997); 40 C.F.R. §§50.1-50.12.
16. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, Regulatory Impact
Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air Quality
Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule 16-17 (1997) (Executive Summary),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
17. See WHITE HOUSE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE POLICY BOOK 3 (February 14,
2002) (stating that power plants emit 67% of all SO 2 emissions and 25% of all NO,
emissions), available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/roclear skiesbook.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002). The proposed new legislation would reduce power
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the extent that legislative proposals reduce NOx and SO 2 emissions
from power plants, they make these emissions sources increasingly
unimportant relative to other sources.18
Third, the Clean Air Act still requires states to implement federally
approved plans to attain health-based air quality standards by reducing emissions in those areas where air quality does not adequately
protect public health. 19 Continued enforcement of the Clean Air Act
implies that, even under a trading regime, states still enforce limits
that attain health-based air quality standards.
Market prices for NOx and SO 2 emissions permits do not correspond with available information on environmental damages. In
2001, SO 2 allowances traded for between $152 and $211, while
NOx permits in the northeast regional market traded at around
$2,000. 2 1 Yet a ton of SO 2 causes environmental damages 3 to 5
plant emissions by 75%. See infra Legislative Proposal section. The share of S02
and NOx emissions from power plants after reductions would fall to about 34%
and 8%, respectively, assuming that emissions from other sources do not change.
A hypothetical increase in emissions of 20% of these values would be less than
5% for SO 2 and less than 2% for NOx.
18. See Press Release, supra note 5.
19. See Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2002).
20. See EPA Clean Air Market Programs, Cumulative SO 2 Trading Activity
Table, at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/ so2market/cumchart.html (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002) (charting estimates of year 2000 S02 allowance trading
volume); EPA Clean Air Market Programs, Monthly Average Price of Sulfur Dioxide
Allowances,
at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/so2market/
pricetbl.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (noting that price information originated
with the brokerage firm Cantor Fitgerald and Fieldston Publications market survey).
21. No centralized source exists for market price information. This is a conservative estimate reflecting discussions with staff at trading firms, government
economists, and some independent reports. See generally EPA Clean Air Market
Programs, No,
Allowance
Market Analysis
(April, 2001),
at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/trading/noxmarket/pricetransfer.html (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002) (showing estimates of market information). N.B.: NO, emissions
allowance trading currently pertains to a five-month seasonal program, rather than
the annual restrictions included in' legislative proposals. Allowance prices are
greater under a seasonal program because capital costs must be recovered over a
smaller amount of emission reductions. See Dallas Burtraw et al., Cost-Effective
Reduction of NOx Emissions from Electricity Generation, 51 J. AIR & WASTE
MANAGEMENT 1482-84 (2001); see also DALLAS BURTRAW, RANJIT BHARVIRKAR
& MEGAN MCGuINNEss, UNCERTAINTY AND THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF
REGIONAL NO, EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION 29-31

(Resources
for
the
Future
Discussion,
2002),
available at
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDFfiles/020 I.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
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22
times larger than a ton of NO., according to government estimates.
Thus, it is economically nonsensical for the more damaging pollutant
to be subject to less costly controls. Allowing tradeoffs between
NO, and SO 2 is one way to avoid such outcomes.
The idea that NOx and SO 2 emissions permits can be traded for one
another is not new. Amendments to the Clean Air Act provide: "Not
later than January 1, 1994, the Administrator shall furnish to the
Congress a study evaluating the environmental and economic consequences of amending this subchapter to permit trading sulfur dioxide
allowances for nitrogen oxides allowances." 23 Unfortunately, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has not implemented this
directive. 24 Independent researchers have studied economic gains
from inter-pollutant trading but have 2been
unable to persuade poli5
cymakers to adopt this type of trading.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I shows that
current legislative proposals to limit power plant emissions do not
allow trading between pollutants or any integration of the markets
for both pollutants. In Section II we argue that trading of NOx and
SO 2 emissions can create economic and environmental benefits.
Section III presents a quantitative analysis showing that the integration of NO, and SO 2 markets could save more that $1 billion annually. Before concluding, we show, in Section IV, that integrating
markets could also increase environmental protection.

22. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
46 (June 2000), available at

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

http://www.whitehouse.gov/ omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf (last visited Dec.
20, 2002). (presenting ranges of monetary benefits for reducing emissions of NOx,
SO 2, particulate matter, and hydrocarbons).
23. Clean Air Amendments of 1990 § 403c, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (1990),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa.text (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
24. Phone conversation with EPA staff member, EPA Clean Air Markets,
Office of Air and Radiation, October 18, 2001.
25. See generally, e.g., ALAN KRUPNICK, ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVE NO,
CONTROL IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 21 (Resource for the Future, 2000),
available at http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc Aapers /PDFfiles/0018.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002)(suggesting that the EPA should consider altering its trading
policy to achieve greater economic efficiency).
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I. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS To LIMIT POWER PLANT EMISSIONS Do
NOT ALLOW TRADING BETWEEN POLLUTANTS.

Current law allows for trading of SO 2 emissions from fossil-fired
power plants, subject to an aggregate emission cap established under
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments.26 Affected facilities
may trade and bank SO 2 allowances, but the aggregate cap is fixed
without regard to how much of an NOx emission reduction the particular facility might be willing to offer in exchange for an increase
in S02. Emissions of NOx from fossil-fired plants are also regulated
under Title IV, but according to an emission rate standard rather than
an emission cap. 7 Emission trading is allowed for NO, under reqUlations that are specified by the Environmental Protection Agency. 8
Most current bills addressing air pollution of power plants apply 29a
cap-and-trade approach to emissions of NOx and SO 2 individually
and none allow tradeoffs in the aggregate levels of emissions between different pollutants. The Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee passed Senator Jeffords' S.556 to reduce power
plant emissions of each pollutant by roughly 75% and to allow for
trading of emissions allowances. The Bush Administration's Clear
Skies Initiative proposes final caps on SO 2, NOx, and mercury emission allowances similar to those of the Jeffords' bill, 31 but allows a
26. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (1994). The
annual cap pertains to the allocation of emission allowances. Annual emissions
may be greater than actual annual allocations because of the opportunity to bank
allowances from previous year allocations.
27. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (1994).
28. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 10 7 th Cong. § 132(b) (2001);
Clean Smokestacks Act of 2001, H.R. 1256, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001); Acid Rain
Control Act of 2001, S. 588, 107th Cong. § 4(a) (2001); EPA Fact Sheet on Clear
Skies
Initiative
.2-3,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/finalclearskiesfactsheetjul.pdf (last visited Dec.
20, 2002) (noting that existing SO 2 cap and trade provisions served as a model for
the Clean Skies Initiative). For a point-by-point comparison of the major proposals to regulate multiple pollutants from the electricity sector, see Resources for the
Future,
Making
Sense
of
Multipollutant
Legislation,
at
http://www.rff.org/multipollutants/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
30. See Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001).
31. Compare the President's Clear Skies Initiative's aims to cap SO 2 emission
allowances at 3 million tons, NO, at 1.7 million tons, and mercury ("Hg") at 15
tons with Jefford's proposal.
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longer timeline over which to achieve them.3g Whereas the Jeffords'
bill would accomplish complete reductions by 2008, the Bush Clear
Skies approach would not mandate final reductions till 2018. 33 Both
Clear Skies and the Jeffords' Bill provide for limits that can be
achieved by trading among sources within a particular pollutant but
not between different pollutants. 34 Figure 1 summarizes the caps on
NOx and SO 2 emissions that these bills would put in place alongside
estimates of the emissions that would occur in 2007 without new
legislation.35
Late in the 10 7 th Congress Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) introduced
S.3135 as an intended compromise proposal.3 The bill would establish caps for SO 2 of 2.25 million tons, equivalent to S. 556, but not
32. See EPA Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative 2-3, available at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/finalclearskiesfactsheetjul.pdf
(last visited Dec.
20, 2002); see also White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush
Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear-skiesfactsheet.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002).
33. See White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiesfactsheet.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002). Senator Jeffords' bill, S.556, limits the three pollutants to 2.24
million, 1.51 million, and 4.8 tons, respectively, in 2007.
See OFFICE OF
ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-EMISSIONS STRATEGY Table 1 (prepared for Senators James M. Jeffords and Joseph I. Lieberman, October 31, 2001),
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002). Both proposals allow banking so annual emissions may remain above annual allocations of emission allowances until the bank is exhausted.
34. See EPA, Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskes/clearskiesfactsheet-3-26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002) (describing Clear Skies Initiative mandatory emissions reduction plan based
on a cap and trade program). The cap and trade program establishes federally
enforceable emissions limits for each pollutant and allows sources to transfer these
among themselves to achieve the required reductions at the lowest cost. See also
Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. § 132(b) (2001) (providing the
objectives, guidelines, and authority for EPA activity in this area).
35. See generally ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS
AND FORECASTING, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF-2001-04, REDUCING
EMISSIONS OF SULFUR DIOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDES, AND MERCURY FROM

ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS
Table ES-1 (2001),
available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/ mepp/pdf/sroiaf(2001)04.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002) (analyzing the impact of three scenarios for reducing power sector
emissions of NO,, SO 2 and Hg).
36. Clean Air Planning Act of 2002, S. 3135, 107 th Cong. (2002).
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fully phased in until 2015. It would establish a cap of 1.7 million
tons for NO,, the same as the Clear Skies Initiative, but this would
be achieved by 2012. The bill includes mercury limits that are midway between the other bills caps for carbon dioxide ("C0 2"), a
greenhouse gas, more moderate than S. 556. Like S. 556 and S.
2815, the bill would treat NOx and SO 2 as two separate pollution
problems and prohibit tradeoffs in aggregate emissions of these two
pollutants.
. Policymakers' neglect of trading between NO, and SO 2 is surprising because trading between two pollutants seems a textbook example of a cost-effective regulatory strategy that can create economic
and environmental benefits.
II. INTEGRATING TRADING OF Nox AND S0 2 ALLOWANCE MARKETS
CAN CREATE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS.

A. IntegratingTrading Of Nox And S0 2 Allowance Markets Can
Avoid Unnecessary Costs Imposed By FixedStatutory Limits.
Standard conditions for cost-effective environmental protection are
that the incremental control cost relative to the incremental damages
avoided must be the same for each pollutant. 37 In order to be costeffective, emissions controls must reflect the incremental effects of
NOx and SO 2 on both environmental damages and emissions control
costs. Congressional proposals that specify caps on NOx and SO 2
without (apparent) regard to relative incremental costs and damages
are therefore very likely to be unnecessarily costly.
To demonstrate this point, suppose emissions of NOx and SO 2 were
capped at N. and S, respectively, i.e., point K on Figure 2. The rate
that SO 2 emissions can substitute for NOx emissions (and NOx emissions cuts for SO 2 emissions cuts) without increasing environmental
damages is given by the slope of the iso-damage curve reflecting all
the combinations of emissions that give damages D2 . The rate that
SO 2 emissions can substitute for NOx emissions (and NOx cuts for
SO 2 cuts), without increasing compliance costs is the slope of the
iso-cost curve reflecting control costs C2 . Any shift in emissions
that decreases NOx and increases SO 2 while keeping emissions
within the lens-shaped area formed by D2 and C2 would improve
37. See WILLIAM J. BAUOMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 47 (1988).
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environmental protection while reducing compliance costs. In Figure 2, both environmental damages and compliance costs could be
reduced by an emissions control strategy that reduced NO, emissions
and increased SO 2 emissions. Cost-effective NO, and SO 2 emissions
caps occur only at points of tangency of iso-damage and iso-cost
38
curves, like point J, which is at the point of tangency of Cl and D 1.
Thus, the relative costs and the relative effects of the two pollutants
on environmental damages are crucial to ensuring that emissions
control policies avoid unnecessary costs. Legislative proposals that
arbitrarily fix the ratio of emissions forego opportunities simultaneously to lower costs and improve the environment.
Estimating the potential gains from integrating NO, and SO 2 markets requires information about how the costs and relative environmental benefits change with changes in the mix of emissions. 39 We
address these below.
B. EstimatingBenefits OfIntegratingNo, And S02 Markets
Requires Information On Relative Control Costs.
We review existing estimates of relative control costs and then
present some of our own. Developing estimates of the potential
gains from integrating NO, and SO 2 markets requires information
about more than the relative incremental controls cost at emissions
levels likely to result from legislative proposals. As we have just
shown, it also requires information about how control costs change
as the mix of emissions shifts. Government agencies have not yet
estimated total incremental control costs for NOx and SO 2 for different mixes of these two pollutants, so we develop our own estimates
of control costs after reviewing some estimates that government
agencies have already completed.
1. Recent Government Estimates.
The EPA and the Energy Information Agency ("EIA") have prepared studies of permit pricing of NOx and SO 2 under various emission control scenarios. None of these reports are directly comparable, however, since they are based on different assumptions.

38. See id. at 45-47, 169-72.
39. See id. at 160-168 (highlighting the importance of considering complex
factors in analyzing the marginal net damage of polluting activity).
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In its analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative, EPA estimated relative
permit prices for NOx and SO 2 emissions that vary significantly by
region and by stage of implementation. 40 Because the Bush Administration's proposal would separate the NOx permit market into an
eastern and western region, the relative costs of controlling the two
pollutants differ by region.41 EPA's estimates show that the permit
price of SO 2 relative to the permit price of NO,, given the Clear
Skies Initiative emissions reductions of 67% for NO, and 73% for
SO2 by 2018, would be around 68% for the East and 266% for the
West.Z Table 1 presents EPA's estimates of relative permit prices
for the Clear Skies Initiative, illustrating that they vary by region and
over time.
Table 1
Marginal Costs of Controlling SO 2 Emissions
Relative to Marginal Costs of Controlling NO, Emissions
(In Percent)
43
Bush Administration Clear Skies Initiative
2018-2022
2008-2012
NO, Region
East

50

68

West

75

266

The Energy Information Administration ("EIA") recently estimated SO2 and NOx permit prices implicit in various emission control scenarios and showed the price of NOx emissions permits would

40. See EPA, IPM SYSTEM SUMMARY REPORT: IPM2000S153DC.DOC,
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES REPORT OF CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE 10.1, 10.29,
10.30, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/epa-ipm/results.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (offering tables of emissions at certain plants of SO2, NO,
East, and NO, West).
41. See EPA Regional Differentiation in the Clear Skies Initiative, availableat
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/geo-scope4 11 .pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see
also Clear Skies Act of 2002, S. 2815, 107i Cong. § 451-3 (2002).
42. See EPA, supra note 40, at 10.1, 10.29, 10.30.
43. See EPA, supra note 40, at 10.1, 10.29, 10.30 (providing tables of emissions at certain plants of SO 2, NO, East, and NO West).
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be less than the price of SO 2 emissions permits.44 These estimates
provide information about the relative marginal control costs, since
permit prices reflect marginal control costs. 4 5 The report analyzes
three scenarios: 50%, 65% and 75% cuts in both NOx and SO 2 emis-

sions. The estimated marginal cost of reducing SO 2 emissions would
be 17%, 29% and 14% in 2010, respectively, of the marginal cost of
reducing NOx emissions. 46 In 2020 the report estimated the marginal cost of reducing SO2 emissions would be 65%, 95%, and 62%,
respectively, of the marginal cost of reducing NOx emissions.
EPA also estimated permit prices for pollutant emissions cuts of
interest to different Senators, and found that S02 permit prices relative to Nox permit prices varied with different scenarios for emissions reductions. 48 Since the President remains opposed to mandatory carbon emissions cuts, 49 we focus here on the scenarios without
them.
Relative marginal control costs for SO 2 and NOx for different
emissions reduction scenarios are reported in Table 2. EPA attrib44. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14.
45. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14. These
numbers were used in calculating marginal control costs for this article.
46. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, supra note 35, at Table B14, C14, D14. The
EIA also assumed in these scenarios that mercury emissions would be cut by 50
%, 65 %, and 75 %, respectively. See id. at vii.
47. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, supra note 35, at Tables B14, C14, and D14.
48. See EPA, ANALYSIS OF MULTI-EMISSIONS PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S.
ELECTRICITY SECTOR REQUESTED BY SENATORS SMITH, VOINOVICH, AND
BROWNBACK
9-10
(2001),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/air/meproposalsanalysis.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (reporting in reponse to request by the senators for analyses of reductions of SO 2,
NO,, and Hg emissions). In a separate report, the EPA estimated compliance costs
and permit prices for emissions cuts of 75% for both NOx and SO 2 in response to a
request from Senators Jeffords and Lieberman. See Office of Atmospheric Programs, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA, Economic analysis of a Multi-Emissions
Strategy Table 3 (prepared for Senators James Jeffords and Joseph Lieberman;
October 31, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002) (showing incremental policy costs). The estimates in response to Senators Jeffords and Lieberman, however, are not directly comparable
to those in the
Clear Skies
Initiative,
the EIA's,
or the
Smith/Voinovich/Brownback report because the EPA considered scenarios that
included mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide emissions. See id.
49. See Letter from George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and
Roberts
(May
13,
2001),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html. (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002).
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utes the differences
between its estimates and EIA's estimates to a
50
variety of factors.
Table 2
Emissions Control Scenarios:
Percent cut in
emissions,
NO, and S02

Marginal Costs of Controlling SO 2 Emissions
Relative to Marginal Costs of Controlling NOx
(In Percent)

EIA
Analysis
(2020)

EPA: Smith/
Voinovich/Brownback
2
Request

EPA:
Jeffords/Liebermann
Including Carbon
Cuts.53

50

65

212

NA

65

95

134

NA

75

62

110

17 to 20

l

50. See EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Comparison of Jeffords-Lieberman
and
Smith-Voinovich-Brownback
6-9
(2001),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/air/finalanalyses.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). N.B.: None
of the factors distinguishing the EPA and EIA analysis are directly relevant to an
analysis of inter-pollutant trading.
51. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY supra note 35, at tables B14, C14, and D14.
52. See ENERGY INFO. AGENCY supra note 35, at 10.
53. See Office of Atmospheric Programs, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA,
Economic analysis of a Multi-Emissions Strategy 14 (Prepared for Senators James
Jeffords
and Joseph
Lieberman;
Oct. 31,
2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/jeffordslieberm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (showing
incremental policy costs).
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2. Modeling Predicts Relative Incremental Control Costs.
As the recent government analyses offer inadequate information to
estimate the efficiency gains from integrating NOx and SO2 markets,
we also use Haiku, a model of electricity markets developed by researchers at Resources for the Future, to generate estimates of permit
prices and compliance costs. 54 The model has been compared with
other simulation models in two series of meetings of Stanford University's Energy Modeling Forum. 55 The Haiku electricity model
simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets and interregional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for SO2 and
NOx emission control technology choice.56 The model calculates

54. See generally ANTHONY PAUL & DALLAS BURTRAw, THE RFF HAIKU
ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL 1 (Resources for the Future, 2002), available at

http://www.rff.org/reports/PDFFiles/haiku.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). The
model has been used extensively in journal articles published in the peer-reviewed
economics literature. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw et al., UNCERTAINTY AND THE
COST-ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL NO, EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM ELECTRICITY
GENERATION
(Resources
for
the
Future,
2002),
available at
http://www.rff.org/discpapers/PDFfiles/0201.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002);
see also Dallas Burtraw, et al., Ancillary Benefits of Reduced Air Pollution in the
United States from Moderate Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies in the Electricity
Sector
(Resources
for
the
Future,
2002)
available at
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDFfiles/0161.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002);
see also Dallas Burtraw et al., Cost-Effective Reduction of NO, Emissions from
Electricity Generation, 51 JOURNAL OF AIR & WASTE MANAGEMENT 1476-89
(2001). The model was also used for a study sponsored by the State of Maryland
Department of Natural Resources. See Karen Palmer et al., Electricity Restructuring, Environmental Policy, and Emissions, (Resources for the Future 2002), available at, http://www.rff.org/reports/2002.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Further
information on the model is available from the authors. See also SPENCER
BANZHAF ET AL., EFFICIENT EMISSION FEES IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR 2,
11-12 (Resources for the Future, 2002); see also, Karen Palmer et al., Capping
Emissions: How Low Should We Go?, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, at 28-36
(Dec. 2002).
55' See ENERGY MODELING FORUM, FINAL REPORT OF EMF WORKING GROUP
15, A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 22 (Stanford Univ. 1998), available
at http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2002) (summarizing a comparison of simulation models); see also ENERGY
MODELING FORUM, FINAL REPORT OF EMF WORKING GROUP 17, PRICES AND
EMISSIONS IN A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKET 1-6, 31 (Stanford Univ.
2001), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/home/index.html (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002).
56. See ANTHONY PAUL & DALLAS BURTRAW, THE RFF HAIKU ELECTRICITY
MARKET MODEL 1 (Resources for the Future Report, June 2002), available at
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electricity demand, electricity prices, the composition of electricity
supply, inter-regional electricity trading activity among 13 regions of
the United States, and emissions of NOx, SO 2, and carbon dioxide
from electricity generation. 57 Three customer classes are represented: residential, industrial, and commercial. 58 Detail about demand functions is provided and supply curves are calculated for four
time periods (super-peak, peak, shoulder, and baseload hours) in
each of three seasons (summer, winter, and spring/fall). 59 The model
determines investment in new generation capacity and retirement of
existing facilities, based on capacity-related costs of providing service in the future ("going forward CoStS"). 60 Generator dispatch in
the model is based on minimization of short run variable costs of
generation. 6 1 The variable costs of emission controls plus the opportunity cost of emission allowances under cap-and-trade programs are
of generation in establishing the operation
added to the variable cost
62
capacity.
of generation
The algorithm for compliance with NOx emissions caps in Haiku
solves for the least cost set of post-combustion investments from
among three control options: selective catalytic reduction (SCR),
selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) and reburn. 63 For control of
SO 2 , the model distinguishes coal-burning model plants by the presence or absence of flue gas desulfurization (scrubbers). Unscrubbed
coal plants have only one potential SO 2 post-combustion abatement
technology, a retrofit scrubber, but firms also may select from a seby sulfur content and price as a strategy
ries of coal types that vary
64
emissions.
SO
2
to reduce
For simplicity, we model only one scenario, picking emissions
caps that approximate those we believe the 108 th Congress might
adopt. Estimates derived from the Haiku model for a scenario that is
http://www.rff.org/reports/PDFFiles/ haiku.pdf, at 1 (last visited Dec. 20, 2002)
(providing model documentation).

57. See id. at 5.
58. See id. at 7, 15, 16.
59. See id. at 15-18.
60. See id. at 18-22, 32.
61. See ANTHONY PAUL & DALLAS BURTRAW, THE RFF HAIKU ELECTRICITY
MARKET MODEL 16-18 (Resources for the Future, June 2002), available at
http://www.rff.org/reports/PDFFiles/haiku.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (providing model documentation).

62. See id. at 25-26.
63. See id. at 38-42.
64. See id. at 36, 43-46.
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close to the Administration's Clear Skies Initiative suggest similar
relative incremental control costs similar to EPA's estimates.65 For
simplicity we model only one scenario, picking emissions caps that
approximate those we believe the 10 8 th Congress might adopt. For
the year 2015, we assume caps for NOx and SO 2 of 1.5 million and
2.5 million tons, respectively, but exclude caps for carbon and mercury emissions from our baseline analysis. 66 In this case, the price of
S02 allowance relative to the price of NO, allowances, that is the
relative incremental control cost, is 1.4. 67 Compared with the relative incremental control cost estimates for the Clear Skies Initiative
presented in Table 1, this estimate is greater than the figure for the
East and less than the figure for the West.
C. Estimating Unnecessary Costs Requires Information On Relative
IncrementalEnvironmental Damages From NO And S0 2.
Existing estimates of the marginal damages of NO, and SO 2 are at
best approximations, but they indicate that the benefits of reducing
SO 2 are greater than the benefits of reducing NO,. The government
has provided recent estimates of the relative incremental damages
from NO, and SO2 . The federal Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") reported estimates of the benefits of reducing NOx, that
were arguably methodologically superior to estimates that ignored
65. Unlike the Clear Skies Initiative, our scenario does not include an emissions cap for mercury. See White House Clear Skies Initiative Fact Sheet, President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clear skies factsheet.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002) (predicting that implementation of the President's Clear Skies Initiatives would reduce NOx emissions to 1.7 million tons and SO 2 emissions to a
cap of 3 million tons in 2018).
66. The Clear Skies Initiative has an SO 2 cap of 3.0 million tons and a NO,
cap of 1.7 million tons. See S. 2815, 10 7th Cong (2002). The Jeffords Proposal has
an NO, cap of 1.51 million tons and a SO 2 cap of 2.25 million tons. See S. 556,
107' h Cong. (2002). The timing of the two proposals varies, with Jeffords Proposal achieving its ultimate reduction targets nearly a decade earlier. See BILLY
PRIZER & DALLAS BURTRAW, A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 556 AND S.
2815 (Resources for the Future, 2002), at http://www.rff.org/JeffordsClear/o20Skies%20table%209-25-02.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Also, both
proposals include the opportunity for banking, which means that annual emissions
would not approximate annual allowance allocations until after the bank reaches
equilibrium. Id.
67. The numbers that we present are the arithmetic averages of the relevant
values for the 11 year period from 2010 to 2020.
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the effects of NOx on particulates, and ranged from $960 to $2500
per ton for the emissions reductions from one rule (the OTAG NO,
SIP call), and from $1,350 to $2,100 per ton for the emissions reductions from another rule (issued under Section 126) in 2007.68 We
disagree with OMB estimates that depend on an assumption that
NO, reductions have no particulate matter concentrations, because
we believe that this assumption is indefensible. The federal Office
of Management and Budget recently reported that the monetary
benefits of reducing emissions of SO 2 were $3,768 to $11,539 per
ton. 69 Taking the ratio of lower bounds and upper bounds respectively suggests that SO2 damages
are between 2.8 and 5.5 times
70
greater than NO, damages.
An analysis by EPA also supports the conclusion that reducing
SO 2 emissions is more valuable than reducing NO,, emissions. 71 It
suggests that mortality-related benefits per ton of NO, reduced are
around $1,300 and the benefits per ton of SO 2 reduced are around
$7,300 for electricity generating units. 72 These estimates, which
were intended to provide an "order of magnitude approximation
rather than a precise estimate," 73 reflect only the mortality-related
benefits because the author believes these accounted "for over 90
percent of monetary benefits in previous analyses." 74 This EPA
analysis suggests that the environmental damages from a ton of SO 2
emissions are about 5.6 times greater than damages from a ton of
NOx emissions.75
Academic research confirms these government estimates. Economists report that reductions in sulfates, or more generally reductions
in emissions of SO 2 , yield about 3.2 times more benefits per ton than
68. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 46 (2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf
20, 2002).

(last visited Dec.

69. See id.
70. See generally id: (presenting information from which damage estimates
can be calculated).
71. See Memorandum from Bryan Hubbell of the EPA's Innovative Strategies
and Economics Group entitled Benefits Associated with Electricity Generating
Emissions Reductions Realized Under the NSR Program 1 (2002) (on file with the
FordhamEnvironmentalLaw Journal).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See generally id. (providing information from which damage estimates
were calculated).
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reductions in nitrates, or more generally reductions in emissions of
NOX. 76 An integrated assessment model, the Tracking and Analysis
Framework (TAF), is used to explore a wide range of SO2 and NO,
emission levels and locations. 77 Estimates of the marginal benefits
of emission reductions generally vary widely with geography and
with the modeler's choice of parameters to describe atmospheric
transport of pollutants, epidemiology, and economic valuation of
health effects. 78 Yet, a robust relationship between the potency of
sulfates and nitrates with respect to marginal benefits is reported.79
Interestingly, their estimate may be relatively insensitive to new scientific information about the health risks or economic valuations of
changes in health status. New information that affects the incremental benefits of S02 and NOx by the same proportion will leave
the relative incremental benefits unchanged.8 °
The true uncertainty is greater than implied by the range of existing estimates because the biological mechanism by which fine particles might cause mortality at the relevant concentration (for exam76. See SPENCER BANZHAF ET AL., EFFICIENT EMISSION FEES IN THE U.S.
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 2, 11-12 (Resources for the Future, 2002) (noting that differences in geographic location of emission cause large differences in marginal
benefits), available at http://www.rff.org/discpapers/PDF_files/0245.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002).
77. Tracking and Analysis Framework ("TAF") was developed in support of
the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program ("NAPAP") and is work of a
team of more than 30 modelers and scientists from institutions around the country.
See

NATIONAL

SCIENCE

AND

TECHNOLOGY

COUNCIL,

NATIONAL

ACID

PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: AN
at
available
(1998),
A-4
A-2,
ASSESSMENT
INTEGRATED
http://www.nnic.noaa.gov/CENR/NAPAP/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2002); see also
id. at A-7. Each module of TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts
in that field. As the framework in which these literatures are integrated, TAF itself
was subject to an extensive peer review in December 1995, which concluded that
"TAF represent[s] a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated assessments" and that the model was ready for use by NAPAP. See OAK RIDGE
NATIONAL LABORATORY, PEER REvIEw OF THE TRACKING AND ANALYSIS
FRAMEWORK (TAF) FOR USE IN THE 1996 NAPAP INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 3
N.B.: The entire model is available at
(ORNL/M-4994, 1995).
http://www.lumina.com/taflist (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). See generally, Cary
Bloyd, ANL/DIS/TM-36, Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) Model
Documentation and User's Guide (Argonne National Laboratory, 1996).
78. See BANZHAF ETAL., supra note 75, at 13-15. See also Dallas Burtraw &
Erin Mansur, Environmental Effects of S0 2 Trading and Banking, 33
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 3489-94 (1999).
79. See BANZHAF ETAL., supra note 75, at 11-12, Figures 2a, 2b.
80. See BANZHAF ETAL., supra note 75, at 14.
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pie, 15 micrograms per cubic meter of particulate matter with a diameter of less than 2.5 microns) has not yet been identified.8 '
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS SHOWS REDUCED COMPLIANCE COSTS
FROM INTEGRATING

NOx AND SO 2 PERMIT MARKETS.

Integrating NOx-SO2 permit markets can generate significant cost
savings. The government cannot provide these savings simply by
legislating an emissions cap because relative control costs will
change over time, and such changes will alter the most cost-effective
combination of emissions controls. 82 Integrating the two markets
with an appropriate trading ratio will allow for the greatest possible
cost savings irrespective of how developing control technologies
may affect the relative cost of reducing NO, and SO 2 .
A. Baseline Assumptions.

For simplicity, we focus on one scenario, picking emissions caps
that approximate those we believe the 10 8 th Congress might adopt.
In our judgment, however, our quantitative estimates would change
only slightly with small variations in NOx and SO 2 caps, although
they might vary significantly if carbon emissions were also subject
to a stringent cap. For the year 2015, we assume caps for NOx and
SO 2 of 1.5 million and 2.5 million tons, respectively, but exclude
caps for carbon and mercury emissions from our baseline analysis.83
81. See NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT-RTP OFFICE, OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/P-99/002BB,

SECOND EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT OF AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR PARTICULATE

MATTER
Vol.11,
pages
8-10
(March,
2001),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/partmatt/VOLII AQCD
PM_2ndReviewDraft.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (discussing limited available data to discern mortality rates).
82. See BAUOMOL & OATES, supra note 37, at 41.
83. The Clear Skies Initiative has an S02 cap of 3.0 million tons and a NO,
cap of 1.7 million tons. See S. 2815, 10 7 th Congress (2002). The Jeffords Proposal has an NO, cap of 1.51 million tons and a SO 2 cap of 2.25 million tons. See
S. 556 10 7th Congress (2002). The timing of the two proposals varies, with Jeffords Proposal achieving its ultimate reduction targets nearly a decade earlier. See
BILLY PIZER & DALLAS BURTRAW, A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 556 AND
S. 2815 (2002), at
http://www.rff.org/Jeffords-Clear 0 20Skies%20table%209-25-02.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002) Also, both proposals include the opportunity for banking, which
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In this case, the price of SO2 allowance relative to the price of NOx
allowances, that is the relative incremental control cost, is 1.484
Under such an approach, the market is willing to reduce SO 2 emissions by one ton in exchange for increasing NOx emissions by 1.4
tons. 85 We also presume that the relative incremental environmental
damage from SO 2 is 3 times as great as from NOx, 86 although we
address in a later section the implications of uncertainty in this estimate.
B. CalculatingSavings From IntegratingNO, And S02 Markets.
The level of NOx and SO 2 emissions as they may be capped by the
10 8 th Congress is shown as point B - the baseline scenario - in Figure 3. Points on a line with a slope of-3 that goes through the baseline scenario at point B thus have emissions levels that offer environmental protections equivalent to point B. Allowing firms to acquire one SO 2 permit in exchange for three NO, permits, or vice
versa, would shift emissions along the line. Such shifts would continue until the relative incremental cost of controlling emissions
equals the exchange rate of three NOx to one SO 2. At any other level
of emissions firms could make money by buying the relatively inexpensive permit from the market, exchanging it for the relatively
more expensive one, and then selling it for cash. We identify two
points (J and K) on this trading line that have a ratio of marginal
costs illustrated by the nonlinear isocost curves that have slopes
somewhat less than and somewhat greater than -3. The lowest cost
point on this line lies between these two points J and K in Figure 3,
where an isocost curve with a slope of -3 is just tangent to the trading line.
means that annual emissions would not approximate annual allowance allocations
until after the bank reaches equilibriur.
84. The numbers that we present are the arithmetic averages of the relevant
values for the eleven year period from 2010 to 2020.
85. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing relative permit
prices). The relative permit price is 1.4, which means that the incremental cost of
controlling one ton of S02 is 1.4 times the incremental cost of controlling one ton
of NO,. Thus, increasing NOx emissions by 1.4 tons will lower control costs by
the same amounts as a reduction in SO,, emissions of one ton. Since such a change
in emissions sources would not raise control costs, we assume that emissions
sources would be willing to undertake such a change.
86. See BANZHAFETAL., supra note 75, at 2, 11-12; see, e.g., OMB, supra note
22, at 46.
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This analysis suggests that integrating markets for NO. and SO 2
permits could reduce compliance costs by at least $1.1 billion annually, from $11.8 billion to $10.6 billion.8 The $1.1 billion excludes
changes in the consumer surplus from higher electricity prices,
which are typically smaller than compliance costs. 88 From a baseline scenario that resembles Clear Skies, market integration (shown
by points J and K) would increase NO, emissions between 1.5 million and 2 million tons per year, while lowering SO 2 emissions by
0.5 million to 0.67 million per year according to analysis using the
Haiku model. Given the evidence that the benefits of reducing SO 2
are about three times as large as the benefits of reducing NO,, this
change in the mix of emissions would not reduce expected environmental protection.
C. Dealing With Uncertainty

Montero analyzes in detail the merit of integrating related pollutant
markets when regulators face uncertainty about the marginal benefits
of different pollutants. 89 He shows that even with uncertainty about
the benefits, as long as the marginal cost curve is steeper than the
marginal benefits curve - that is, the absolute value of marginal costs
are greater than marginal benefits in the vicinity of emissions targets
- the economically
optimal policy is to integrate the pollutant control
90
markets. The rationale is that interpollutant trading provides flexibility to firms to avoid high control costs by shifting control efforts
to a pollutant that is relatively inexpensive to control. If the marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal benefit curves, the
regulatory should pay more attention to the cost of control rather

87. These estimates reflect the average of the annual cost savings over the
years 2010 to 2020. During this period the Clear Skies Initiative involves increasingly stringent caps. See EPA, Clear Skies Initiative Summary 6,12 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiessummary04-11 .pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2002) (graphing the cost of SO2 and NOx reductions for 2010-2020).
N.B.: Cost savings in a particular year are not necessarily representative.
88. See Karen Palmer et al., Restructuring and the Cost of Reducing NO,
Emissions in Electricity Generation (Resources for the Future, 2001), availableat
http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDFfiles/ 011OREV.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
89. See Juan Pablo Montero, MultipollutantMarkets, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 76274 (2002).

90. See id. at 762.
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than the amount of control, and therefore, markets should be integrated. 91
There are several reasons to believe that marginal cost curves are
steeper than the marginal benefit curves. The marginal benefit
curves are essentially flat, because the values of the risk reduction
from exposure to fine particles, which are the vast majority of all
benefits, appear to vary linearly with concentration. 92 In addition,
NOx and SO 2 from power utilities are only a relatively small share of
total emissions, so the change in emissions from these sources
will
93
have a diluted impact on aggregate emissions and air quality.
IV. ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF TRADING
CAN BE CONTROLLED.

Integrating NOx and SO 2 markets is only a small departure from
current policy. All major legislative proposals allow NOx and SO 2
emissions from any given plant to depend in large part on market
conditions, while setting national emissions rates by statute. 94 However, current programs do not fix national NO, levels. For example,
plants with dissimilar access to low-sulfur coal or with different incremental control costs would emit different mixtures of NOx and
SO 2 for any given set of emission permit market prices. In this
sense, an exchange of S02 permits for NOx permits is not qualitatively different in its effects on environmental protection than the
type of trading already in place. Trading NOx for SO 2 is unlikely to
weaken environmental protection relative to existing and likely programs.
91. See id at 763. In the other case, where the marginal benefit curves are
steeper, the regulator should pay more attention to the amount of control in each
market, and therefore the markets should be separated. Id.

92. See OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA-410-R-99-001, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT: 1990-2010, EPA REPORT TO CONGRESS, p. 57, D-8, D-9 (1999), availableat
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/frullrept.pdf.
(last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
93. See POLICY BOOK, supra note 17.
94. See S. 556, 10 7th Cong. § 706 (2002); S. 588, 10 7th Cong. §§ 4(b), 7
(2002); S. 2815, 107 th Cong. § 403 (2002); H.R. 5277, 107 Cong. § 403 (2002);
H.R. 1256, 107h Cong. § 2(b)(B) (2002) (providing for trading); see also S. 556,
107 Cong. § 704 (2002); S. 588, 107 th Cong. § 2 (2002); S. 2815, 107 th Cong. §§th
th
413-4, 441 (2002); H.R. 5266, 107 Cong. §§ 413-4, 441 (2002); H.R. 1256, 107
Cong. § 2 (2002) (limiting emissions).
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A. ManagingRisks
Deriving an unbiased estimate of relative damages is difficult. For
this reason, it may be worth considering approaches that reduce the
risk that integrating NOx and SO 2 markets actually damages the environment. The simplest approach would be for a government office
simply to exchange permits in a way that reduces expected environmental damages. For example, a government office could sell 30
NO, permits in exchange for 11 SO 2 permits (or sell 10 SO 2 permits
for 33 NOx permits). Either trade would provide a tax "for the environment" of ten percent given that expected environmental damages
from SO 2 are three times as great as from NO. As long as the tax is
not excessive, trades at these distinct
exchange rates would reduce
95
expected environmental damages.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of environmental benefits
from this approach, we consider a case where the government grants
permits to emit two tons of NOx in exchange for a permit to emit a
ton of SO 2 . As noted earlier, two tons of NOx cause less expected
environmental damage than a ton of SO 2 . In this case, from the
baseline of 1.5 million tons of NOx and 2.5 million tons of SO 2,
firms would willingly exchange permits for a half million tons of
SO 2 in order to obtain permits to emit an additional million tons of
NO. To see this, note that they could profit by such trades because
our analysis with the Haiku model indicates that in the baseline scenario a permit to emit a ton of SO 2 is about 1.4 times as expensive as
a permit to emit a ton of NO. Firms that give up permits to emit 10
tons of SO 2 in exchange for permits to emit 20 tons of NO, would
profit by the value of permits to emit 6 tons of NO. Such profitable
exchanges would continue until the cost of reducing SO2 emissions
rose to equal twice the cost of reducing NO. emissions. 96 Our analysis with the Haiku model implies that this condition would occur
with annual NO, emissions of 2.5 million tons and annual SO 2 emissions of 2 million tons. The Haiku model indicates that the costs of
95. Offset programs in areas that do not attain- national ambient air quality
standards already require such emission reduction ratios. Many analysts believe,
however, that these ratios have significantly impeded trading. See Bob Hahn &
Gordon L. Hester, Where did all the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 146 (1989) (analyzing the EPA's
emissions trading program).
96. At this point the government would be offering to exchange SO 2 permits
for NOx permits of equal value.
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achieving these emissions limits are $800 million per year less than
in the baseline scenario, but net environmental damages have also
fallen by the equivalent of a half million tons of NO,. The reductions in SO 2 emissions of a half million tons per year from the baseline scenario have environmental benefits equivalent to 1.5 million
tons of NO, given the evidence summarized above that the incremental environmental damages of a ton of NOx emissions are about a
third of the incremental damages of a ton of SO 2. These benefits
outweigh by an amount equivalent to about a half million tons of
NO, the environmental damages from increased NOx emissions relative to the baseline scenario.
A refinement of this approach would allow different exchange
rates for different ratios of NO, and S02 emissions. It may make
sense to allow further increases in NOx emissions only in exchange
for progressively larger reductions in SO 2 emissions. For example,
as NO, emissions from power plants increase, municipalities may
find it harder to meet EPA's ozone air quality standard because NOx,
but not SO2 , contributes to ozone. 97 Regulators could allow firms to
get 30 NOx permits for every 10 SO 2 permits, but only up to a given
level, beyond which the rate might change to 30 to 11.
B. State And Local Health-BasedRegulations Will Buttress Federal
TradingApproaches.
Some public health advocates may oppose NOx-SO 2 trading because increases in emissions of NOx emissions - but not SO 2 emissions - can result in elevated ozone concentrations. Although ozone
is a less significant health risk than particulates formed from sulfates
98
and nitrates, ozone is associated with childhood asthma attacks.
There may be concerns that families should not bear increased risks
of asthma attacks in children in exchange for reduced mortality from
particulates that would primarily affect elderly parents.
There are several flaws with this argument. Although NO, may
contribute to more frequent asthma attacks among children, NOx
emissions from utilities under either S.556 or the Clear Skies Initiative would be around 8 % to 10 % of total NOx emissions, so a given
percentage increase in utilities' NO, emissions is a much smaller
97. See EPA Air Quality Standard For Ozone, 40 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-53.21, 58.158.32 (1997).

98. See id.
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percentage increase in the total. 99 Further, the philosophy and strategy of Title I of the Clean Air Act is to allow states to choose how,
but not whether, to meet federally mandated health-based ozone
standards.10 0 The multi-pollutant bills will be buttressed by addi-

tional local
emissions reductions in locales where air quality is
10 1
poor.
To further reduce the risk of adverse environmental effects from
NOx-SO 2 exchanges, Congress, after authorizing trades between NO,
and SO2 , could change EPA with reviewing new scientific evidence
to assess whether exchange rates reflect unbiased estimates of relative incremental environmental damages. Congress could authorize
EPA to change the exchange rates through rulemaking if it concluded that the exchange rate lowered air quality.
CONCLUSION

Congress should encourage changes in the mix of NO, and SO 2
emissions, in particular, emission reductions of the pollutant for
which the bang for the buck is greater. Existing legislative proposals
to control multiple pollutants from power plants do not take advantage of opportunities to reduce both environmental damages and

99. We calculate 8% as a ratio between the S.556 proposal of 1,550,000 tons
of NOx emissions and total NO, emissions from all anthropogenic sources in 2007
as projected in the regulatory analysis for EPA's 2000 Heavy Duty Engine and
Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, or 20.6
million tons. See OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA420-R-00-026, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: HEAVY DUTY ENGINE AND
VEHICLE

STANDARDS

145,

AND

HIGHWAY

DIESEL

FUEL

SULFUR

CONTROL

Table
II.B-27
(2000),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/hd2007/frm/ria-ii.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002)
(listing total NOx emissions in 2007 along with components due to vehicles and
other sources). Ten percent is the Clear Skies Initiative's emissions cap of 1.7
million tons of NO, emissions in 2018 relative to the total emissions of NO, from
anthropogenic sources in 2020 as projected in the same analysis, or 17.9 million
tons. See S. 556 10 7th Cong. § 704 (Jeffords Proposal NO, emissions levels); EPA
Fact Sheet on Clear Skies Initiative 2 (2002),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskiesfactsheet_3_26.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2002) (Clear Skies Initiative NO, emissions levels).
100. See Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
101. The purposes of the bills do not include a goal to eliminate the need for
additional local emissions reductions. See, e.g., S. 556, 1 0 7 th Cong. (2001) and
H.R. 5266, 1 0 7th Cong. (2002).
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compliance costs because they adopt a pollutant-by-pollutant approach, and prohibit shifts in the mix of NOx and S02 emissions.
While choosing the right NOx-SO 2 exchange rate may be difficult,
there is no doubt that an outright prohibition of such transactions is
excessively prescriptive and burdensome. It makes sense only given
the irrational assumption that a reduction in national emissions of
NOx (or SO 2), regardless of its size, could never compensate for a
one-ton increase in emissions of SO2 (NOx). Yet, all multi-pollutant
proposals offered to date embody this approach.
To further reduce the risk of adverse environmental effects from
NOx-SO 2 exchanges, Congress could charge EPA with reviewing
new scientific evidence to assess whether exchange rates reflect unbiased estimates of relative incremental environmental damages.
Congress could authorize EPA to change the exchange rate through
rulemaking if it concluded that the exchange rate lowered air quality.
Congress should abandon the pollutant-by-pollutant approach that
it has used to develop new emissions legislation because it is incompatible with cost-effective environmental protection. The mix of
emissions should vary with control costs and not be set at absolute
and unchanging statutory levels. Allowing markets to choose the
lowest cost set of NO, and SO 2 emissions from among ones with
equivalent environmental effects will lower the costs of emissions
controls. Economic modeling suggests that cost savings from integrating NOx and SO 2 markets can exceed $1.1 billion per year without reductions in environmental benefits. This no-lose solution
should interest both those environmentalists and industry representatives who promote cost-effective clean air policy.
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Figure 1
NO, and SO2 Utility Emissions
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Note: The curve that goes through the H.R.1256 emissions cap represents the set of NOx and SO2 emissions where compliance costs are
approximately constant, based on EIA's estimates of SO2 and NOx
permit prices for the emissions reductions in an earlier version of
S.556, which was identical to H.R. 1256.
Effective dates for the bills differ slightly. Emissions allowance caps
for S.556, which are very similar to those in H.R. 1256, would be
effective in 2008; the NO cap in S.588 would begin in 2004 and grow
until 2007; H.R. 1256 would be effective in 2007, while the Administration's Clear Skies proposal would take effect in 2008 and specify
increasingly stringent caps for 2010 and 2018. Banking enables emissions to remain above allowance caps until the bank is exhausted.
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Figure 2
Improved Air Quality and Reduced Compliance
Costs with NOx-SO 2 Trading
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Figure 3

Npx-SO2 Permit Trading Saves More than $1 Billion Annually
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Note: The diamonds labeled Clear Skies, ".", represent emissions
under the Bush administration's proposal in 2010 and 2018. The
squares representing points B, J and K refer to annual levels of NO,
and SO2 emissions averaged over the years 2010 to 2020. The isocost curves going through these three points are the sets of NOx and
SO 2 emissions where annual control costs are constant at $11.8 billion, $10.7 billion and $10.6 billion respectively. The slopes of the
various iso-cost curves at the points B, J and K represent the incremental costs of controlling SO 2 relative to the incremental costs of
controlling NOx. The iso-damage line represents the combination of
NOx and SO 2emissions expected to offer the same protection to
health and the environment as point B. It assumes that one ton of
SO 2, is as damaging as 3 tons of NO,.. Since points B, J and K all
offer the same level of protection, but differ by at least $1 billion
annually in control costs, by allowing firms collectively to increase
NO, emissions in exchange for additional SO 2 reductions, should
save at least $1 billion annually without lowering environmental protection.

